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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103, Utah Code
Annotated, and the Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to this court for
disposition.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The standards of review applicable to the issue raised under defendant’s Issue #1 are as
follows.
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is
based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to
the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional
determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law
upon which we do not defer to the district court.
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶ 8, 2 P.3d 451, 454.
Additionally, “A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown
Rule 60(b) grounds, and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been
an abuse of discretion." Id at 110, ¶ 9.
Where the trial court relies only on documentary evidence to determine whether
jurisdiction exists, “If there are no material disputes in the documentary evidence, the appellate
court reviews the matter de novo to determine whether as a matter of law jurisdiction exists.
Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 815 P.2d 245, 248.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the issue set forth under defendant’s Issue #1 was not
preserved in the trial court, and in fact was not even raised before the trial court.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(b) How presented.
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted.
(h) Waiver of defenses.
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the
2

parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have
been received.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

The following are the facts applicable to this case, as supported by the Affidavit of Gary
G. Kuhlmann in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and documents attached
thereto, Record (“Rec.”) at pages 46 - 63, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A,
and the Findings, Conclusions and Order of the trial court, Rec. at pages 94 - 100, a copy of
which is attached as Addendum 5 to the Brief of Appellant. To avoid unnecessary repetition,
reference to the record shall be to Appellees’ Addendum A and Appellant’s Addendum 5 where
applicable.
1.

The complaint was filed in the trial court on August 16, 2007, and was served

upon the defendant on August 20, 2007. Rec. at pp. 1 - 18.
2.

During September, 2007, plaintiffs’ counsel, Gary Kuhlmann, was contacted by

Sharon Nelson, attorney for the defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer
the complaint. She informed Mr. Kuhlmann that she believed her client was not liable to the
plaintiffs because her client had purchased the involved dealership after the sale of the
motorhome at issue in this case to the plaintiffs. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 3; Addendum 5 at p. 2,
¶¶ 3 - 4.
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3.

In mid-September, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension

to allow her a short time to provide Mr. Kuhlmann with evidence that her client was not the
proper party in the case. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 4; Addendum 5 at p. 2, ¶ 5.
4.

After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson, Mr.

Kuhlmann’s office contacted Ms. Nelson’s office by phone on October 15, 2007, and demanded
that the requested information be provided or an answer filed. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 5;
Addendum, 5 at p. 2, ¶ 6.
5.

On October 30, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a fax from Ms. Nelson containing a

two page Bill of Sale which was apparently part of a larger contract. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 6;
Addendum 5 at p. 7.
6.

On that same date, Mr. Kuhlmann’s office responded to Ms. Nelson’s fax and

informed her that to evaluate the matter, and determine who was responsible for the dealership
liabilities, Mr. Kuhlmann would need to receive the Purchase Agreement and other documents
related to the alleged sale of the dealership. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 7; Addendum 5 at p. 3, ¶ 8.
7.

On November 1, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a second fax from Ms. Nelson

requiring that Mr. Kuhlmann sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents
would be provided. The demand was for a general confidentiality agreement and was not limited
to financial or proprietary matters. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 8; Addendum 5 at p. 3, ¶ 9.
8.

Mr. Kuhlmann refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was the

defendant that was requesting that the defendant be dismissed from the case and because to do so
could prejudice the plaintiff in using the information in the purchase documents in the case in the
trial court. Addendum 5 at p. 3, ¶ 10.
4

9.

After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms.

Nelson, on November 27, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann, by letter, advised Ms. Nelson that plaintiffs
would be seeking the entry of default and default judgment. Addendum A at p. 2, ¶ 9;
Addendum 5 at p. 3, ¶ 11.
10.

An Application for Entry of Default and a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment

were filed with the court on November 27, 2007. Rec. at pp. 19 - 22.
11.

A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment

was entered on December 4, 2007. Rec. at pp. 23 - 25.
12.

Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default

judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant’s
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default. Addendum A at p. 3, ¶ 12; Addendum 5
at p. 3, ¶ 14.
13

On December 19, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a phone call from William

Frazier, the new attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked if Mr. Kuhlmann would be willing
to stipulate to set aside the default judgment based upon his assertion that his client had
purchased the business after the plaintiff’s purchase of the motorhome at issue. While Mr.
Kuhlmann refused to simply stipulate to set aside the default without some evidence of the
factual assertions of defendant’s counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann relayed to Mr. Frazier a continuing
willingness to review any documents Mr. Frazier would like to provide, and emphasized Mr.
Kuhlmann’s frustration with prior defense counsel’s failure to provide any type of
documentation as previously promised. At the end of this conversation, Mr. Frazier informed
Mr. Kuhlmann that he would obtain and provide Mr. Kuhlmann with documentation to show that
5

Mr. Frazier’s client was not the proper defendant in this matter. Addendum A at p. 3, ¶ 13;
Addendum 5 at pp. 3 - 4, ¶¶ 15 - 17.
14.

Despite being told yet again that Mr. Kuhlmann would be provided certain

documents by the defendant, no further documents were provided and no further contact from
defendant’s attorneys occurred until February 27, 2008. On that date Mr. Kuhlmann received a
voice-mail message from defendant’s counsel simply indicating that he would be filing a Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment. Addendum A at pp. 3 - 4, ¶ 14; Addendum 5 at p. 4, ¶¶ 18 - 19.
15.

Despite being told repeatedly that Mr. Kuhlmann would be receiving certain

documents for review, the same were never provided by defendant. Addendum A at p. 4, ¶ 15.
16.

The defendant filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on February 29,

2008, four days shy of three months from the date of entry of the Default Judgment. Addendum
5 at p. 4, ¶ 20; Rec. at pp. 30 - 33.
17.

The defendant was afforded over three months to provide the plaintiffs with the

documents requested by plaintiffs or to file an answer. Addendum 5 at p. 4, ¶ 21.
18.

The only evidence provided to the trial court to try to demonstrate the existence of

a meritorious defense were the conclusory statements of defendant’s counsel that:
a.

The evidence will show that plaintiffs have sued the wrong party.

b.

Defendant did not own the subject dealership when the plaintiffs

purchased the recreational vehicle.
c.

Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the proper party, and

that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant is highly questionable. Addendum 5 at
pp. 4 - 5, ¶ 22.
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19.

At no time did the defendant seek to dismiss the case or have the default judgment

declared void, but rather sought only to set aside the default judgment in this matter under Rule
60(b)(1) and (6). Rec. at p. 30 - 33.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The defendant’s claim that the default judgment should have been set aside under Rule
60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was not raised in the trial court. Rather, the defendant’s
claim for relief was premised only on Rules 60(b)(1) and (6). This court should not review an
issue raised for the first time on appeal, especially where there is no evidence in the record which
supports the asserted issue.
All of the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint were deemed admitted when defendant
failed to file an answer and the default judgment was entered. Further, the defendant waived any
defense based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction when it failed to raise such defense in a
responsive pleading or by motion before filing a responsive pleading.
After reviewing the defendant’s arguments as contained in the defendant’s motion and
hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion since
there was no excusable neglect, surprise, inadvertence or mistake shown by the defendant.
Additionally, the defendant, in its motion for relief from the default judgment, failed to even
address whether a meritorious defense existed to the plaintiff’s claims.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Defendant Raises Issues on Appeal which were not Raised in the Trial
Court nor Properly Preserved for Appeal.

The defendant asserts that it has disputed personal jurisdiction “in first and all subsequent
pleadings.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 12. However, the defendant has never filed a pleading in this
case. Defendant also asserts that its motion to set aside the default judgment was “brought on the
grounds that the Trial Court (sic) lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, among other
grounds.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 12. Defendant then claims that the trial court erred by not
setting aside the default judgment as being void, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. These assertions by the defendant simply are not true.
The defendant’s claim that the defendant should be granted relief from the default
judgment based upon the judgment being void was not raised, briefed nor argued in the trial
court. Since the defendant chose not to provide this court with transcripts of the hearing before
the trial court, this court is left with only the printed record. The only evidence in such record
regarding the defendant’s claims for relief from the judgment are in the defendant’s motion and
memorandum seeking relief from the default judgment, a copy of which is attached to the
defendant’s brief as Addendum 2, and the accompanying affidavits, copies of which are attached
to defendant’s brief as Addenda 3 and 4.
As evidenced by the defendant’s motion, memorandum and affidavits, the motion was
specifically “brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Addendum 2 at p. 1. The defendant argued only that “the subject judgment was
issued subsequent to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, (sic) and excusable neglect.” Addendum 2
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at p. 2. While defendant made certain conclusory and unsupported statements regarding whether
the defendant was a proper party and claimed that the defendant “has legitimate and valid legal
defenses, including misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction,” Addendum 2 at p. 4, nowhere
in the motion nor the affidavits submitted therewith is there a single fact supporting a dispute of
personal jurisdiction. In fact, the motion itself indicates that the defendant was not raising such
issue by the motion but wished to have the judgment set aside because “Defendant will be able to
demonstrate that . . . any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly questionable.
. . .” Addendum 2 at p. 4.
The ”Conclusion” of the defendant’s motion and memorandum is perhaps the most
telling. In such conclusion, the defendant does not request that the court dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction or find the judgment void due to lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the defendant
“requests that the Default Judgment entered against it on or about December 5, 2007 be set aside,
due to mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, (sic) and surprise.” Addendum 2 at p. 4. Thus,
the issue of whether the judgment was void under Rule 60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
was never raised in the trial court, was never briefed by the parties, was never decided by the trial
court, is raised for the first time in this court, and was not properly preserved for determination
by this court.
II.

Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendant has been Admitted and any
Defense of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction has been Waived.

Setting aside the default judgment based upon an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction is
also unsupported since the defendant has never properly raised the issue, never presented any
factual basis for such claim, personal jurisdiction has been admitted, and the defendant has
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waived any defense based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. While the defendant’s brief to
this court makes several assertions as to why personal jurisdiction is lacking, none are supported
by any evidence in the record and none were raised in, or presented to, the trial court. The
defendant did not file an answer disputing the plaintiffs’ claims of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Nor did the defendant file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. At
the time the defendant filed its only motion, the plaintiffs had already been granted judgment.
The defendant’s failure to contest the allegations of the complaint before default resulted in the
allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint being admitted. See Cody v. Lowe, 2008 UT App 440,
2008 Utah App. LEXIS 438, citing Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(“When allegations in a complaint are not properly contested by an opposing party, they are
deemed admitted.”); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971)
(Allegations in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not
denied in a responsive pleading). In this case, the defendant has not filed any responsive
pleadings in this matter and default was entered. Therefore, all facts of the complaint are deemed
admitted.
The defendant’s claims regarding personal jurisdiction were also waived by the
defendant. Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted.
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Additionally, Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant’s failure to raise the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction by motion prior to pleading, or in a responsive pleading, constitutes a waiver of such
defense. The same applies to the defendant’s claim that it is not the proper party to this case. In
Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976), after judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the
defendant claimed that he should not have been found liable in his individual capacity but in a
corporate capacity. The court found “Any objection to a defect of the parties is waived, if not
asserted by a party as provided in Rule 12(h).” Thus, defendant’s claim that it is not the right
party to this action has been waived.
III.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the
Defendant’s Motion for Relief from the Default Judgment.

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the trial court, after weighing the evidence and
arguments before it, properly ruled that there was not a sufficient basis for granting the defendant
relief from the default judgment. In the context of reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for
relief from a judgment, the Utah Supreme Court has noted:
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or
denying a motion to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1),
U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of this
discretion is clearly established . . . . The rule that the courts will incline towards
granting relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to present his case, is
11

ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will not reverse the
determination of the trial court merely because the motion could have been
granted. For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in refusing to
vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy demand more than a
mere statement that a person did not have his day in court when full opportunity
for a fair hearing was afforded him or his legal representative.
In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only
show that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any
other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must also show that his motion to set
aside the judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action.
****
The latter question [of a meritorious defense] arises only after consideration of the
first question [of excusable neglect] and a sufficient excuse therefrom being
shown . . . . Furthermore . . . . it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate to
even consider the issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a
sufficient excuse has been shown.
State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-1056 (Utah 1983). Based upon the evidence before
the trial court, and as reflected in the record, it is evident that the trial court did not abuse its
“considerable latitude of discretion” in denying the defendant’s motion.
A

The defendant failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect.

It has been noted in relation to a Rule 60(b) motion that “A prime requisite precedent to
the granting of such relief is that the movant demonstrate that he comes to the court with clean
hands and in good faith.” Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah 1956). This, the
defendant did not do. Defendant asserts that there was continuing dialog between counsel, that
various documents requested by the plaintiffs were provided by the defendants, and that each
time documents were provided, plaintiffs’ counsel requested additional documents. Appellant’s
Brief at pp. 8 - 9. Defendant also asserts that after plaintiffs’ counsel refused to sign a
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confidentiality agreement, “Plaintiffs’ counsel and general counsel for Defendant continued to
attempt to work through their concerns via correspondence, mainly via facsimile.” Appellant’s
Brief at p. 9. Nothing in the record supports these factual assertions.
Both the affidavits of defendant’s general counsel, Sharon Nelson, and the affidavit of
plaintiffs’ counsel, Gary Kuhlmann, show that prior to the entry of default, there was a total of
five contacts between counsel’s offices. In mid September there was a telephone conversation
between counsel wherein Mr. Kuhlmann told Ms. Nelson that she could have a short extension to
answer so she could provide Mr. Kuhlmann with documents supporting her claim that the
defendant was not a proper party to this action. After no contact was received from Ms. Nelson
for approximately a month, Mr. Kuhlmann advised Ms. Nelson, that she should file an answer or
provide the requested documents. No response was received from Ms. Nelson for two weeks, at
which time she sent a fax to Mr. Kuhlmann with a two-page Bill of Sale. That same day, Mr.
Kuhlmann responded and indicated that the Bill of Sale was not sufficient and that the requested
documents had to be to Mr. Kuhlmann by the end of business on November 1, 2007. On
November 1, 2007, Ms. Nelson sent a fax requiring that Mr. Kuhlmann execute a confidentiality
agreement before any further documents would be provided. Mr. Kuhlmann refused to sign the
confidentiality agreement and gave the defendant an additional twenty-six days to file an answer
before seeking a default. No answer nor motion to dismiss was filed during an almost three
month period. During this time, Ms. Nelson called Mr. Kuhlmann’s office once and sent two fax
transmissions. Communication between counsel was far from “continuing.” Additionally, after
having been given a demand that an answer be filed if the documents were not provided, no
documents were provided and no answer was filed.
13

In Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. vs. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975), a father had cosigned a promissory note with his son. When the son failed to make payment, the attorney for
the plaintiff wrote the father and requested payment. The father refused to pay, claiming that he
had only signed for the purpose of obtaining credit for his son. The father was later served with a
summons and complaint. The father called the plaintiff’s attorney, stating that he was not liable
for the debt and that his son was in California. After the plaintiff was unable to find the son, the
plaintiff took a default judgment against the father. The father then moved to set aside the
default judgment on the basis that
he told plaintiff’s counsel that the son was the one who should have been sued and
that the default judgment was not taken until one year after the action was
commenced. He also claimed that he assumed the action had been taken care of
and therefore took no steps to file an answer to the complaint.
Id. at 617. In determining whether such claims justified setting aside the default, the court found
“none of these claims even approaches ‘excusable neglect’ as required under Rule 60(b),
U.R.C.P., in order to be relieved from a default judgment.” Id. The same is true in this case.
Simply claiming that the defendant is the wrong party and then taking no further action does not
support setting aside the default judgment.
After reviewing the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel in the instant case, the
trial court found:
5.
Defendant has asserted no basis for finding the existence of
mistake or inadvertence in this case but rather relies on the claims of excusable
neglect and surprise.
6.
Defendant did not exercise due diligence in this matter since an
answer could have been filed by the defendant at anytime during the more than
three months between that date the Complaint was served and the date the default
was entered. Nothing prevented the defendant from filing such Answer and there
14

were no circumstances outside the control of the defendant which rendered the
defendant unable to file an Answer. An Answer was not filed simply because the
defendant chose not to do so. Based thereon, the defendant has failed to show the
existence of excusable neglect in this case.
7.
The defendant has further failed to establish the existence of
surprise. Defendant’s counsel was told that only a short time would be given to
provide the documents requested by plaintiffs’ counsel and defendant failed to
provide such documents. Further, the defendant was informed that the plaintiff
was seeking a default and a copy of the Application for Entry of Default was
provided to defendant’s counsel. Nevertheless, no action was taken by defendant
to prevent or overcome a default being entered until almost three months after the
default judgment was entered.
Addendum 5 at p. 6. After reviewing the evidence from the record, it cannot be said that the trial
court abused its discretion.
B.

The defendant failed to establish a meritorious defense.

Even if it were arguable that the defendant has established the existence of excusable
neglect or surprise, the defendant has failed, both in the trial court and before this court, to
establish the existence of a meritorious defense. Indeed, the issue of a meritorious defense as a
requirement of relief under Rule 60(b) is not even addressed in the defendant’s brief. As stated
in State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983)
A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed
facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one
entered. Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny the truth
of plaintiffs’ allegations; he must set forth specific facts showing meritorious
defenses to those allegations in order to have the default judgment set aside.
Id. at 1057-1058.
Reviewing the record clearly establishes that the defendant’s motion and supporting
affidavits contain no more than cursory statements that the plaintiffs have sued the wrong party,
that the defendant did not own the subject dealership when the plaintiffs purchased their
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motorhome, and that the plaintiffs have failed to show a proper basis for personal jurisdiction.
The motion and affidavits contain no facts whatsoever, much less a statement of specific and
sufficiently detailed facts, showing a meritorious defense. As the trial court found
The defendant has failed to provide the Court with any “specific and sufficiently
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from
the one entered.” Thus, even if the Court were to find the existence of a mistake,
inadvertence, excusable neglect or surprise, the defendant’s motion is deficient
and should be denied.
Addendum 5 at pp. 6 -7. Clearly such a finding by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the plaintiffs respectfully request that the court affirm the trial
court’s findings, conclusions and order entered June 25, 2008, denying the defendant’s motion
for relief from the default judgment, and that the court award the plaintiffs their costs and
attorney fees incurred herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

31st day of December, 2008.

/s/ Gary Kuhlmann
Gary G. Kuhlmann
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of December, 2008, I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to: William E. Frazier, LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER, 720 S.
River Rd., Suite A-200, St. George, UT 84790.
/s/ Gary Kuhlmann
Gary G. Kuhlmann

16

